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Abstract
Economies are complex man-made systems where organisms and mar-
kets interact according to motivations and principles not entirely under-
stood yet. The increasing dissatisfaction with the postulates of traditional
economics i.e. perfectly rational agents, interacting through efficient mar-
kets in the search of equilibrium, has created new incentives for different
approaches in economics. The science of complexity may provide the plat-
form to cross disciplinary boundaries in seemingly disparate fields such as
brain science and economics. In this paper we take an integrative stance,
fostering new insights into the economic character of neural activity. The
objective here is to precisely delineate common topics in both neural and
economic science, within a systemic outlook grounded in empirical ba-
sis that jolts the unification across the science of complex systems. It
is argued that this mainly relies on the study of the inverse problem in
complex system with a truly Bayesian approach.
1 Introduction
Since the financial crash in 2008, economic science and the economic pro-
fession are under siege. Critics point fingers at ivory tower economists,
devoted to the construction of unfalsifiable models based on unrealistic as-
sumptions in purely theoretical basis. Economies are complex man-made
systems where organisms and markets interact according to motivations
and principles not entirely understood yet. Neo-classical economics is ag-
nostic about the neural mechanisms that underlie the valuation of choices
and decision making. The increasing dissatisfaction with the postulates
of traditional economics i.e. perfectly rational agents, interacting through
efficient markets in the search of equilibrium, has created new incentives
for different approaches in economics. Behavioral economics [3],[25] builds
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on cognitive and emotional models of agents, neuroeconomics addresses
the neurobiological basis of valuation of choices [23],[14] or Evolution-
ary economics [5], [7],[6],[2],[8] which strives for a new understanding of
the economy as a complex evolutionary system, composed of agents that
adapt to endogenous patterns out of equilibrium regions. The science of
complexity may provide the platform to cross disciplinary boundaries in
seemingly disparate fields such as brain science and economics. Social
science, and in particular economics, is undergoing a decisive historical
moment. New mathematical models able to palliate the dissatisfaction
with core tenets in classical economics, like rational agents, symmetric
information and equilibrium need to be devised.
We argue that the most important problems that natural and social
science are facing today are inverse problems, and that a new approach
that goes beyond optimization that takes into account the subjective
knowledge of the agent is necessary. The rest of the paper is organized
as follows. Section 2 describes the main assumptions of orthodox eco-
nomics and why they provide an ill-founded basis. Section 3addresses the
issue of predictability, and it is argued that the idea of having predicting
model in non deterministic physics, entails a wrong understanding of the
ill-posed nature of the inverse problem. Section 4 provides a new theoret-
ical framework for modeling complex economic systems that emphasize
the relevance of adopting an “inverse thinking” approach in solving the
inverse problem. We conclude with Discussion in 5.
2 Orthodox economics
The core tenet of orthodox economics axiomatically states that agents
are 1) perfectly rational 2) maximizers of a function cost and 3) interact
in an equilibrium market. This triad has has shown itself to be fatally
flawed. Markets are instruments of extraordinary efficiency in processing
information, integrating the views of a large number of agents regarding
the prices of complex assets. In classical economics, it is assumed that
prices fully reflect all available and relevant information, which is equally
accessible for all agents. In this view, prices adjust almost instantaneously
to every new piece of information or perturbation driving each price to its
new equilibrium state.
There are several drawbacks to this theory. First, markets are com-
posed of heterogenous agents with very different models, motivation and
strategies. Second, the rationale that markets are regulated by a sort of
homeostatic mechanism able to drive prices to their intrinsic values, has
been disproved during financial crashes. It might be emphasized that this
view is also reductionist, in the sense that information is ultimately and
entirely reflected in one variable, the price of the stock. Third, the idea
of equilibrium is an intrinsic epistemic asset in conventional economics.
Thus, an economic explanation can be seen as finding the minimum set of
basic assumptions necessary for establishing the existence of equilibrium
which is unique and stable [20]. Conventional economic models, in order
to make their models workable i.e. get the analytical solutions, entail un-
realistic assumptions such as, the existence of a global conservative law
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or perfect competition between agents, which are utility maximizers that
make an optimal use of information that is identically available for all the
agents.
3 A new look to predictability
In several occasions, economic models have shown to be powerless in pre-
dicting bubbles and crashes that were invariably followed by important
disruptions in economic activity and even social unrest. It might be re-
marked that modern macroeconomic theory may not possibly predict cri-
sis, because it is built upon a corpus of theoretical assumptions in which
such extreme events may not be predicted at all [1]. Yet it is worth re-
minding that the use of terms like predictability or deterministic behavior
in systems of the extraordinary complexity of national economies is, at
best, a formidable exercise of optimism. This statement is also valid for
systems of very reduced dimensionality. Since Lorenz [21] and Ro¨ssler
[24], it has been known that chaotic behavior may occur in systems with
as few as three variables. Thus we cannot pretend to find predictability
in systems which are myriad of order of magnitude larger. Clearly, we
might not ask for a new science of economics with predictive powers in
situations where predictability is out of place. We can only expect from
social scientists to predict financial bubbles and market crashes, as much
as it is expected from natural scientists to predict earthquakes, tsunamis
or virus mutations.
3.1 The inverse problem
The main point that we want to make here is that all the problems in
the previous section, predicting financial bubbles, tsunamis hits etc. are
inverse problems. Inverse problems are ill-founded and that is the rea-
son why we are bad at predicting those critical events.To solve an inverse
problem is to infer the value of parameters of interest for a given phe-
nomenon, based on the direct measurement of observables. This form of
inference is ill-posed in the sense that solutions to the problem may not
exist, be multiple, and be instable, that is, small error in the measure-
ments lead to large differences in the solution [16]. In engineering the
inverse problem is to solve the inverse of the forward model’s equations,
that is, given the equations that describe the system’s configuration or
system’s internal state m(x), calculate the equations of the position and
momentum of the system y.
m(x) = y, x = m−1(y) (1)
Systems identification or inferring the model m from the accumulation
of observations (xi, yi) is also an inverse problem, in statistics system
identification is called regression problem.
There are strong limitations to this approach, not only technical is-
sues like the unrealistic assumption of linearity in order to use frequency
domain techniques, but at the phenomenological level. First, the problem
is ill-posed in the sense that there are infinitum continuous time functions
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f , that perfectly match the sampling data, that is, we have redundancy.
Second, the problem is unstable because small errors in the output func-
tion y may be amplified, resulting in much greater errors in the estima-
tion of the function m. Interestingly, increasing the sampling rate of the
measured function does not solve this situation, it may indeed worsens
it[10]. This condition needs to be conveniently recognized, specially in
the current state of increasingly powerful measurement techniques. New
strategies that aim to quantify the uncertainty in model and data need to
be explored[9], [27]
3.2 Dealing with the bias/variance dilemma in
the inverse problem
In any process of inference lies a fundamental problem, this is what Geman
calls the bias and variance dilemma[13]. The error in approximating a
function f(x) that matches the observed data y, has two components, the
variance which related to the uncertainty in the measurement of data, and
the bias which is due to uncertainties in the model space, ε = b+v, where
ε is the error, b is the bias and v is the variance. The bias and variance
dilemma states that in order to minimize the error we can reduce the error
of one of the components, bias or variance, but not both of them. Thus,
or we bet on variance by assuming that measurement uncertainties are
trivial, or we bet on bias by neglecting inaccuracies in the model, but we
can not get along with both. A direct implication of this statement is
that the idea of finding an optimal solution for the inverse problem must
be abandoned.
The regression problem in statistics, which is a particular case of in-
verse problem, will help us to elaborate this point. The regression problem
is to find an estimator f(x) = y for the purpose of approximating the de-
sire response y. The regression of Y on X is E[Y |X], that is, the mean
value of Y given X. Non parametric estimators can be arbitrarily well ap-
proximated, this property is called consistency and it is the major reason
of the popularity of non parametric estimators such as neural networks
or Boltzman machines. Consistency guarantees that for a sufficiently big
training data set, non parametric estimators achieve the best possible per-
formance for any learning task. It is important to note that the condition
of a “a sufficiently big training data set’ entails that consistency is an
asymptotic property, which can be formally stated as follows:
lim
n→∞
E[f(x)− E[y|x]] = 0 (2)
that means that non parametric estimators f(x) are consistent for all re-
gression problems E[y|x]. But there is a toll to pay here. The versatility
of the estimator to optimally approximate any task is necessarily sensitive
to the characteristics of the data. For example, when data samples are
small or have dispersed distribution, parametric estimators may outper-
form non parametric ones. Indeed, non parametric estimators are optimal
because they are consistent, but consistency is an asymptotic property.
In real problems, the training data set can not be assumed to be arbitrar-
ily big, therefore we have to deal with the variance. If we acknowledge
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this basic fact we can see clearly that the traditional approach in the in-
verse problem, consisting on finding the operator or model that optimally
predicts the outcomes is unrealistic because it is based on an asymptotic
property i.e. consistency, and technically unsuitable due to nonlinearities
in the functions to be optimized and the high dimensionality in space of
candidates.
4 Cisbioeconomics
We coin the term cisecobionomics which refers to the study in biological
basis of how economic units make decisions to adapt within a ecosystem,
using an inner or subjective perspective. Here we understand economic
unit as a system with an internal representation of itself, for example
living organisms (and not only them) are economic units, ecosystem as
the network of economic units that are modeled using an internal or first
person cis approach. The internal perspective aims at quantifying what
information the economic unit has about its world, rather than quantify
the information that external observers have of the economic unit. It
ought to be remarked that the rationale in using optimal functions such
as utility or value in either brain and economic theories, must be found
not only in mathematical tractability. This approach entails an idea of the
inverse problem that is at odds with the ill-posed nature of the problem.
We need to introduce a priors or bias, that is, knowledge of the model pa-
rameters such that variability can be reduced without eliminating possible
solutions.
It has been proposed the the function of all nervous systems can be
viewed as “decision-making” to promote future biological fitness [11]. In
this respect, decision making in the brain can be seen as a process that
tries to minimize its uncertainty about the world. Thus the computational
goal of the brain is to anticipate the output of actions in order to mini-
mize uncertainty about its world. This view is compliant with Helmholtz
conceptualization of the brain as an inference machine that predicts sen-
sations. The use of Bayesian probability theory has additionally suggested
a complementary view in which the brain aims to optimize the probabil-
ity representation of what caused its sensory inputs. The Bayesian brain
hypothesis postulates the brain as an inferential machine, that makes pre-
dictions about the world based on probabilistic models, that are updated
according to the sensorial information available at every moment. Friston
has built a variant on the Bayesian Brain wherein the brain optimizes a
free-energy function that tells the error between the brain internal repre-
sentation and the true state of the world that is being represented [12]],
[19]. The free energy principle integrates other global brain theories that
share the view of the brain as an optimizing machine. For example, in
Hopfield’s approach [17], [4] neural network attractors mediate in cogni-
tive processes like concept formation and memory, and operate according
to the optimization of an overall energy function. In [22] the function
of the brain is to optimize the mismatch between sensory input and the
predicted inputs of the model. The free energy principle aims to unify the-
ories like neural Darwinism, infomax principle or Bayesian brain, which
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share a common assumption i.e. the brain always optimizes one quan-
tity, called value, expectation or free-energy, depending on whether the
approach relies upon economic, Bayesian or thermodynamic theory re-
spectively.
Thus, we have identified a critical common theme that pervades in
brain function modeling and in economic systems modeling: there is one
quantity called by names like value, expected reward or utility that is be-
ing maximized, or minimized in which case the quantity is called surprise,
cost or prediction error. In particular, the free energy is an upper bound
in surprise
surprise =
1
value
(3)
in such a way that organisms avoid undesirable surprising states by min-
imizing their free energy, in order to to keep their internal physiological
state values within regions that promote their survival.
However, the idea that the complex machinery of the brain may be re-
duced to the minimization of one single quantity seems very unlikely. This
is rooted on the mistaken understanding of homeostasis as the universal
physiological principle [15]. There are other forms to achieve dynamic
stability different to homeostasis [28]. Friston understands the brain as
an inference machine that is always optimizing its free energy by avoid-
ing surprises, that is, the brain is constantly minimizing surprises which
may be pernicious for the survival of the organism. It must result ob-
vious that this view is reminiscent to idea of utility maximisation as a
mechanism that drives economies to equilibrium. Among other things, fi-
nancial crashes have very acutely showed that the conception of economic
equilibrium based on the mechanical analogy of a pendulum is untenable.
The benefit attained in terms of mathematical tractability by adopting
the hypothesis that economic agents achieve equilibrium by maximizing
utility, must not make us neglect basic facts. For example, the idea that
economic agents are utility maximizers is unverifiable, it is a necessary a
priori to solve the equations for a unique and stable equilibrium, that is to
say, we need a priori knowledge or bias to deal with the inverse problem.
The bias works as a selection mechanism that reduces the set of solutions
of the inverse problem. Once we have the models that result to apply
a bias, the next step is to test how well they predict. Thus, predictions
allow us to discard forward models when their prediction do not match
a given criterion, but not to solve the inverse problem [26]. The idea of
using optimization as a solver of the inverse problem is untenable and was
described in detail in section .
Economic agents, that is, human beings provided with brains, value
goods and services in order to take decisions referred to those goods and
actions in an attempt to forecast a favorable outcome. But they decide so
in multiple ways according to ecological and historical contexts. Moreover,
their actions have one direction that goes from the irreversible past to the
uncertain future. With this caveat in mind, basic assumptions in the
free-energy principle for the brain like “any self-organizing system that is
at equilibrium with its environment must minimize its free energy [19]”
must be carefully scrutinized. Moreover, to assume ergodicity in a non
dissipative systems like the brain is hardly justifiable [18]. The same critic
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and rationale necessarily applies to economic systems modeling.
5 Discussion
Complexity science has had a considerable success at addressing questions
with a new synthetic vision and a conceptual toolkit that orthodox ap-
proaches miss. However, the answer for many of those questions remain
unsolved. We sorely need to develop a theoretical framework, based on
realistic scenarios in which the plurality of internal motivations of the
economic agents (individuals, firms, institutions), help us to establish a
systemic understanding of complex socio-economic systems. In this pa-
per we defend the view that economics may be called to act as a natural
bridge able to connect social and technological aspects. This positioning
may sound extremely risky, the recent financial meltdown and the inabil-
ity of the economic models to forecast these extreme events, has done
nothing but reinforced the old motto “economics is the dismal science”.
The paper sets the basis of a new theoretical foundation to address
the inverse problem, that is, deduce models of function from the behav-
ioral analysis of the system, with a truly subjective or Bayesian approach.
Predicting financial bubbles, the eruption of a volcano, or the formation
of cognitive neural networks in the brain are inverse problems, which as
we know since Hadamard’s seminal work are not well-posed problems.
The paper explores the challenges that economic modeling faces and put
them in perspective with recent advances in brain function theory like the
free-energy principle. It provides a new perspective in tackling the in-
verse problem, adopting a truly Bayesian internalistic view, that does not
rely on searching an unique solution to the inverse problem through max-
imization of functions like utility. Here we adopt an “inverse thinking”,
which mainly relies on the introduction of bias or a priori knowledge that
constrain the solutions of the inverse problem The candidate models are
then tested against the data, that is, those that do not predict data within
an established criterion are discarded or falsified in Popperian parlance.
Note that this approach is different from solving the inverse problem by
calculating the optimal function that is the best match with the given
data. The paper builds on this approach to provide new insights to com-
plex system modeling that spring from a truly Bayesian approach to the
inverse problem in complex system modeling.
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